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ORDERED LIBERTY: RESPONSE TO MICHAEL DORF
JAMES E. FLEMING∗ & LINDA C. MCCLAIN∗∗

We appreciate Michael Dorf’s serious engagement with our book and his
conclusion that “it responds effectively to the charge that liberalism focuses on
rights to the exclusion of responsibilities.”1 He charges us, however, with an
“errant theodicy” – with making the “claim that we have . . . the freedoms we
have in virtue of a freestanding principle that respectful treatment of persons
requires granting them autonomy as responsibility.”2 He also criticizes us for
deriving basic liberties from a “freestanding interest in autonomy.”3 In this
response we aim to clarify our argument concerning responsibility as
autonomy and to reject the interpretation of our book as deriving basic liberties
from any such freestanding principle of autonomy.
In Ordered Liberty we develop a civic liberalism that answers four charges
against liberal theories of rights: (1) irresponsibility (the argument famously
made by Mary Ann Glendon, that such rights license irresponsible conduct and
preclude governmental pursuit of responsibility in the exercise of rights); (2)
neutrality (that such theories require neutrality among competing conceptions
of the good life, undermining civil society as “seedbeds of virtue” and
precluding government from promoting good lives); (3) wrongness (that
liberals justify rights of autonomy on the ground of “empty” toleration of
wrong conduct instead of respect for the personal capacity for responsibility or
recognition of the substantive moral goods or virtues fostered by protecting
such rights); and (4) absoluteness (that liberals take rights too absolutely, to the
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We thank Michael C. Dorf for writing his thoughtful Review Essay, for presenting it at
the Boston University School of Law Symposium on our book on February 11, 2013, and
for posting a modified version of his Review Essay on the Balkinization blog’s Symposium
on our book, which took place from February 19 to 22, 2013. Symposium on Fleming and
McClain, Ordered Liberty, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 19, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/201
3/03/symposium-on-fleming-and-mcclain.html. Our response is based on our remarks at the
Boston University Symposium and our post on the Balkinization blog in response to Dorf.
We thank Jack Balkin for facilitating the Balkinization Symposium.
1 Michael C. Dorf, Liberalism’s Errant Theodicy, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1469, 1478 (2013).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 1472.
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subordination of responsibilities, virtues, and the common good, and in doing
so debilitate the political processes and impoverish judgment).4
As we understand Dorf, he focuses on our book’s response to the
irresponsibility critique. There, in chapters two and three, we show the degree
to which our civic liberalism permits government to encourage responsibility
in the exercise of rights but not compel what it holds is the responsible
decision. We do not argue for a general right to responsibility as autonomy.
We fear that we may have given the contrary impression through our stylized
contrast between (1) responsibility as accountability to community and (2)
responsibility as autonomy or self-government and our use of Glendon and
Ronald Dworkin as foils representing these two understandings.5 Our response
to the irresponsibility critique, however, is not a political theory project of
deriving rights from a freestanding principle of autonomy. It is a constitutional
theory project of showing the ways in which recognizing constitutional rights
like procreative autonomy leaves room for government to moralize by, for
example, encouraging pregnant women to deliberate responsibly and
conscientiously before having an abortion.
Our primary treatment of the grounds for justifying rights comes later in the
book, in response to the wrongness critique and the absoluteness critique.
There we undertake the constitutional theory project of justifying constitutional
rights already recognized in our constitutional cases on grounds of both
individual autonomy and the moral goods fostered by protecting them. We do
this, for example, with respect to the right of procreative autonomy and the
right to same-sex marriage.6 We grant that our justification of basic liberties is
not merely backward-looking, concerned only with justifying the constitutional
rights already recognized. We contemplate that the constitutional practice of
securing ordered liberty should go on as before, reasoning by analogy from
cases already decided to the new cases that arise, developing lines of doctrine
in a principled and coherent way.7 Even here, though, we propose elaboration
of basic liberties through common law constitutional interpretation and
reasoning by analogy rather than through working from and elaborating a
freestanding principle of autonomy. Indeed, in chapter nine, in our debunking
of the “myth of strict scrutiny for fundamental rights” under the Due Process
Clause and our analysis of the actual practice of reasoned judgment concerning
ordered liberty in the line of cases from Meyer v. Nebraska8 through Planned

4

JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 1-2 (2013).
5 Id. at 6, 51, 53-68.
6 Id. at 177-206.
7 Id. at 241-67; see also JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY:
THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 116-20, 126-27 (2006).
8 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey9 and Lawrence v. Texas,10
we implicitly reject any idea of a freestanding principle of autonomy.
We largely accept Dorf’s list of the various “sorts of reasons [that] justify
the recognition of a right or the conclusion that some proffered justification for
infringing a recognized right falls short.”11 He suggests that autonomy doesn’t
add much, if anything, to the reasons on the list.12 We agree that a freestanding
principle of autonomy does not operate in constitutional cases as a basis for
deriving rights. But we believe that common-sense understandings of
autonomy do manifest themselves in constitutional cases, even through the
very types of justifications on his list. Dorf writes: “For example, one can read
Griswold v. Connecticut to rest on the proposition that there is a right of
married couples to use contraception simply because any effort to enforce the
prohibition would intrude on constitutionally protected privacy.”13 He then
quotes Griswold: “‘Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea
is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.’”14
In justifying Griswold’s recognition of a right of privacy, we interpret these
very passages as reflecting concern to protect freedom of intimate association
within the marriage relationship in order to promote the “noble purposes” of
the institution.15 This interpretation illustrates what we call “deliberative
autonomy.”16 Deliberative autonomy here is a structure that houses and
articulates arguments made for basic liberties in constitutional cases in a way
that shows their coherence and defensibility. The types of reasons for
protecting rights of autonomy are down to earth, ecumenical, and familiar, not
abstract, freestanding, or “theodicean.”17
In clarifying our argument, it may be helpful to contrast two types of
political and constitutional theory. The first purports to derive all of our basic
liberties or constitutional rights from one basic principle, such as autonomy,
dignity, liberty, or equal concern and respect.18 The second, by contrast, begins
with a list of basic liberties typically recognized in constitutional democracies
such as our own (or already recognized in a constitutional practice like ours)
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505 U.S. 833 (1992).
539 U.S. 588 (2003); FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 4, at 241-67.
11 Dorf, supra note 1, at 1475.
12 Id. at 1475, 1477.
13 Id. at 1473.
14 Id. at 1473 n.18 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965)).
15 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 4, at 250-51.
16 Id. at 3-4.
17 FLEMING, supra note 7, at 94-100.
18 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-78 (1977) (deriving a
package of fundamental rights from the constitutive principle of “equal concern and
respect”).
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and aims to show how those basic liberties fit together and are best justified.19
Dorf seems to interpret our theory as the former sort, but it is decidedly the
latter. We begin with the basic liberties already recognized in certain
constitutional cases and show how they fit together and are best justified as
preconditions for what we call deliberative democracy and deliberative
autonomy. In Securing Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy, one
of us (Fleming) called this project a “constitutional constructivism” (by
analogy to John Rawls’s “political constructivism” as developed in his
Political Liberalism).20 The justifications for the basic liberties, moreover,
appeal to the mutual support of a number of considerations that fit or hang
together, not simply to one freestanding principle from which they all derive.21
Dorf may recognize this obliquely, since his “main point” is that “affirming
our belief in people’s capacity to act responsibly does not count for much as a
justification for individual rights, but it is a necessary feature of such rights as
we do recognize.”22
Finally, we grant that some philosophical accounts of free will may amount
to what Dorf calls a liberal “theodicy.” Dorf might criticize Dworkin’s
discussion of free will in Justice for Hedgehogs23 along these lines, and even
more so Dworkin’s recent Einstein Lectures on “religion without god.”24 We
do not believe that our account of securing ordered liberty makes any
“theodicean” claim “that we have any of the freedoms we have in virtue of a
freestanding principle that respectful treatment of persons requires granting
them autonomy as responsibility.”25 Our conception of ordered liberty is
constructivist, not theodicean.
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FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 4, at 3-4; see also FLEMING, supra note 7, at 66-69.
FLEMING, supra note 7, at 61-74; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 89-129 (1993).
21 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19, 48-51 (1971); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 29-32 (2001); RAWLS, supra note 20, at 95-99.
22 Dorf, supra note 1, at 1479.
23 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 219-52 (2011). We are not saying that
such a criticism of Dworkin would be sound, but simply acknowledging that it would be
more understandable that Dorf might criticize Dworkin on this ground.
24 RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (forthcoming 2013); Ronald Dworkin,
Religion Without God, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 4, 2013, at 67.
25 Dorf, supra note 1, at 1478.
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